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TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT: HOW INTIMATE
SHOULD THE CLOSE ASSOCIATION BECOME?
Lee B. Burgunder*
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently the courts have significantly expanded the scope of
copyright protection, especially in the computer and high technology
realms.1 Similarly, the judiciary has interpreted federal trademark
law so as to increasingly protect a wider realm of product character-
istics.2 The latter trend has taken on added importance in light of the
Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, which provides this trend
with a congressional stamp of approval.3 The obvious concern raised
by these movements, as with any instance of property expansion, is
whether they may lead to a fundamental conflict between the roles of
separate intellectual property systems.
Copyright and trademark, along with patent law, coexist within
O 1989 by Lee B. Burgunder
* Professor of Law and Public Policy, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis
Obispo, California. A.B., 1977, Dartmouth College; J.D., 1981, Stanford Law School;
M.B.A., 1981, Stanford Graduate School of Business.
1. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.
1986); Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1988); Digital Communica-
tions Assocs. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987); Broderbund
Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
2. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1987) (protec-
tion extended to cone shaped reel); Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 647 F.
Supp. 1533 (D. Colo. 1986) (protection extended to emotionally expressive non-occasion greet-
ing card); W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985) (protection extended to
trays with hexagonal end panels); LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71 (2d Cir.
1985) (protection extended to color coordinated bag made of parachute nylon with hollow
rectangular zippers).
3. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988-Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (1988). This law provides that section 43(a) of the Trademark
Act of 1946 be amended to read,
Any person who uses in commerce on or in connection with any goods or ser-
vices, or any container for goods, any word, term, name, symbol, or device or
any combination thereof, or who shall engage in any act, trade, practice, or
course of conduct, which (A) is likely to cause confusion or to cause mistake or
to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with
another . . . shall be liable in a civil action . . ..
Id. § 28.
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a tripartite schema of federal intellectual property protection. Patents
are designed to offer creators of useful or ornamental inventions the
substantial incentives required to bring those ideas to the market-
place. The purpose of the copyright system is to provide sufficient
incentives for artists to share their creations with the public. The
federal trademark laws ensure that customers can easily find the
products they seek. Each system has a different role to play, but all
are intended to increase the creative and distributional efficiency of
market participants. Based on this mutual goal, parallels can be
drawn between the rules used in the separate systems to accomplish
their respective tasks. However, while acknowledging these analo-
gies, care must be taken not to extend the protection offered by one
system into that which should be delivered by another.
The purpose of this article is to consider certain analogies
which can appropriately be made between the trademark system and
the copyright system. To this end, there first will be a discussion of
the federal intellectual property concept, and how trademarks and
copyrights properly fit within it. Next, the article will address one of
the most controversial elements of computer technology copyright
protection-the spectrum analysis used to distinguish protectable ex-
pressions from unprotectable ideas. Here, parallels with the func-
tionality and genericide doctrines of trademark law will be ex-
amined. Finally, the functionality considerations of trademark law
will be referred back to concepts introduced by copyright. The article
concludes that trademark functionality is subject to a spectrum anal-
ysis that is substantially equivalent to that used in defining expres-
sions for copyrights.
II. FEDERAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION:
AN OVERVIEW
A. Competition and the Right of Product Imitation
The backbone of the United States market economy is competi-
tion.4 The unhindered ability to compete allows one to further his or
her self-interest by making improvements on products already placed
in the economy. This, in turn, advances the welfare of society as a
whole, since the improvements, by definition, better meet the per-
4. See, e.g., Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 988 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 758 (1943) ("[T]here is a basic public policy, deep-rooted in our econ-
omy and respected by the courts, resting on the assumption that social welfare is best advanced
by free competition .... "); Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1079 (Mass. 1896) ("[Firee
competition is worth more to society than it costs.").
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ceived needs of consumers.' Thus, assuming that inventors have the
proper incentives to disclose their products to the public, free compe-
tition based on those products will best serve the economic interests
of society. For this reason, it is well established that there exists a
fundamental right in this country to compete through imitation of a
competitor's product once it has been offered to the public.6
Although the economy depends on competitive imitation, mech-
anisms must be established to ensure that product ideas are publicly
disclosed by their creators. Creation requires investment. Yet, with-
out safeguards, any creation may be costlessly imitated by competi-
tors as soon as the novelty is openly displayed. Thus, the creator who
has expended time and capital to develop the invention may be una-
ble to recoup such investments because competitive imitators will be
able to take a free ride on them. Faced with such a possibility, a
prospective inventor might choose to wait for others to create desired
products in order to take advantage of their efforts. This may result
in an unwillingness to make the investments needed to bring new
concepts to the marketplace.
The federal intellectual property laws ensure that inventors
have the incentives to publicly disclose their ideas by granting limited
exceptions to the fundamental notion of free competition through im-
itation. The patent, copyright and trademark laws are designed to
provide, in an integrated fashion, the incentives required under the
respective contextual circumstances to sustain creation and
disclosure.
B. The Patent System
One objective of the patent system is to encourage the develop-
ment and disclosure of useful and functional product ideas.7 To this
end, a creator whose invention meets the prerequisites for utility pat-
5. Such improvements include lowering the costs of production, lowering the price of the
product, and increasing the desirability of the product. See, e.g., Burgunder, Trademark Regis-
tration of Product Colors: Issues and Answers, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 581, 582-84
(1986).
6. See, e.g., Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 668 (1969); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 227 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S.
234, 237 (1964); In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1336 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
See Spratling, The Protectability of Package, Container and Product Configurations (Part I),
5 U.S.F. L. REV. 451, 464-65 (1971).
7. See, e.g., To Promote the Progress . . . Useful Arts, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N ON THE PATENT SYSTEM 1-3 (1966) (cited in P. GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT,
TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES 19 (1973)); Kahn, The Role of Patents (cited
in MILLER, COMPETITION, CARTELS AND THEIR REGULATION 311 (1962)).
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ent protection is entitled to a seventeen-year period of exclusivity
during which no other person may compete through imitation or use
of that functional idea.9 Another goal of the patent system, to en-
courage the creation of novel ornamental designs, is achieved through
design patents which bestow a similar, although shorter, period of
exclusivity.9 In both situations, the patent holder enjoys monopoly
status with respect to the protected invention or design, and is legally
entitled to earn monopoly returns during the protected period.
The potential monopoly profits achievable through patent pro-
tection are designed to compensate the creator for investments in in-
novation. However, the rights to such profits must be carefully be-
stowed since the concept of monopoly is antithetical to the
fundamental notion of free competition. Thus, a patent may be ob-
tained only after the inventor undertakes a lengthy and expensive
process to establish that the idea is novel and nonobvious' 0 In addi-
tion, the period of exclusivity, whether it be seventeen years for a
utility patent, or fewer for a design patent, is intended to provide an
appropriate level of incentive while minimizing the detrimental im-
pact on the market economy.
Given the care with which patents are granted, it is necessary to
ensure that similar rights to exclusivity are not acquired by other
routes which are less costly to transverse or which confer protection
for longer periods of time. For example, neither the copyright nor
the trademark system should allow the creator of a useful or orna-
mental idea to earn monopoly profits since protection under these
systems is easier to obtain and has a longer life.
C. The Copyright System
Artistic creations, just as utilitarian inventions, are subject to
free ride problems. Original expression, whether it be composition,
sculpture or graphic art, is not spontaneously generated, but rather
requires human investment. Therefore, artists need certain assur-
ances that others cannot costlessly copy their works before embarking
on their creative endeavors.11 The copyright laws were drafted to
8. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
9. Id. §§ 171-173.
10. Id. §§ 102-103. The statutory minimum fees for receiving a patent are $800 before
the patent issues plus $2,400 to maintain the seventeen-year protection period. Id. § 41. Also,
attorneys' fees often total in the tens of thousands of dollars. Note, Defining the Scope of
Copyright Protection for Computer Software, 38 STAN. L. REV. 497, 504 (1986).
11. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 8-19; Note, Does Form Follow Function? The
IdealExpression Dichotomy in Copyright Protection of Computer Software, 35 UCLA L.
(Vol. 29
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encourage investments in creative expression by carving a limited ex-
ception to the overriding right of competitive imitation. Specifically,
a validly obtained copyright protects an original expression fixed in a
tangible medium by preserving to the author the right to copy that
expression for his or her life plus fifty years.12
Whereas the process of obtaining a patent is expensive and ar-
duous, a copyright is easily procured. Assuming that the artist's ex-
pression has some small degree of creativity, the artist need only
place the proper form of copyright notice on the work to receive pro-
tection from imitation.13 A copyright is relatively simple to acquire
since the potential rewards from it are less than those from a patent.
A patent, by restricting an entire conceptual idea to an inventor, le-
gally allows that inventor to corner a competitive market. Thus, mo-
nopoly profits may be derived for the patent protection period.
Copyrights, as opposed to patents, do not apply to ideas."'
Rather, an author may receive copyright protection only for expres-
sions of ideas. Assuming that an idea may be expressed in numerous
desirable ways, the copyright holder may face competitors who use
alternative expressions. In addition, a copyright only insulates the
author from acts of copying, while a patent extends to similar inven-
tions that are independently created. 5 Thus, a copyright holder may
even face competition from a work identical to his own as long as the
competitor developed his work independently. Therefore, the poten-
tial rewards provided by copyrights are considerably less than mo-
nopoly profits. Instead, they can be likened to the benefits enjoyed by
an oligopolist who must compete in the relevant market with sellers
of other products which are similar, although not identical to its
product in terms of physical and psychological characteristics.
Based on the above considerations, it follows that a copyright
should never be held under circumstances that would enable the
holder to achieve a long-term monopoly status in the relevant mar-
ket. If, for instance, an idea can only be expressed in one or in a very
REv. 723, 762-65 (1988).
12. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106 (1982).
13. Id. § 401.
14. Id. § 102(b) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work of author-
ship extend to an idea. ... ).
15. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories, 797 F.2d 1222, 1227 n.7
(3d Cir. 1986) ("The independent creation of even identical works is therefore not a copyright
infringement, and independent creation is a complete defense to a claim of copyright infringe-
ment."); Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) ("[Tlhe law im-
poses no prohibition upon those who, without copying, independently arrive at the precise
combination of words or notes which have been copyrighted.").
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few ways which are preferred by consumers, that expression should
not be entitled to copyright protection. Rather, the author should
have to comply with the more stringent patent procedures to receive
protection.16 As shall be pursued further in part III of this article,
this is the course followed by the courts when interpreting the intel-
lectual property laws.
D. The Trademark System
The trademark system is primarily designed to increase the dis-
tributional efficiency of the marketplace1 7 and to ensure that manu-
facturers receive returns on their investments in goodwill. 8 In an
environment of perfect imitation, producers investing in services such
as quality control may have difficulty retaining customers who desire
their products because low-cost imitators can easily duplicate all
identifying features on the products, thereby diverting unsuspecting
buyers to their inferior alternative offerings.19 Energetic customers
may devise techniques to locate products from the desired manufac-
turer by engaging in various forms of "search," but these may be
expensive and inefficient. 0 Thus, the right to product imitation may
lead to two undesirable results: (1) quality conscious producers may
suspend investments in goodwill rather than face losses at the hands
of free riders, and (2) customers who value products backed by an
array of goodwill services must waste resources to find them.
16. See, e.g., Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th
Cir. 1971) ("When the 'idea' and its 'expression' are thus inseparable, copying the 'expression'
will not be barred, since protecting the 'expression' in such circumstances would confer a mo-
nopoly of the 'idea' upon the copyright owner free of the conditions and limitations imposed by
the patent law.").
17. See Landes & Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. AND
ECON. 265 (Oct. 1987); Burgunder, supra note 5, at 589; Burgunder, An Economic Approach
to Trademark Genericism, 23 AM. Bus. L.J. 391 (1985); Comment, Trademarks and Generic
Words: An Effect-On-Competition Test, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 868 (1984); Note, Promotional
Goods and the Functionality Doctrine: An Economic Model of Trademarks, 63 TEx. L. REV.
639 (1984); Folsom & Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89 YALE L.J. 1323 (1980).
18. See S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1274, 1275 ("Trade-marks [sic] encourage the maintenance of qual-
ity by securing to the producer the benefit of good reputation which excellence creates. To
protect trade-marks [sic], therefore, is . . . to secure to the business community the advantages
of reputation and good will by preventing their diversion from those who have created them to
those who have not.").
19. Id. at 1274 ("[Wlhere the owner of a trademark has spent energy, time and money
in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his investment from its misappropri-
ation by pirates and cheats.").
20. See Folsom & Teply, supra note 17, at 1336; Burgunder, Economic Approach,
supra note 17, at 392-93; Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at 269.
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Protection of certain identifying product characteristics from
imitation serves to solve these two problems. Customers who are
pleased by products made by a particular manufacturer can locate
them simply by seeking the identifying characteristic which belongs
exclusively to those goods. Consequently, low-cost imitators who in-
tend to free ride on the desired services will be frustrated because of
the identifying feature which they cannot duplicate. Thus, distribu-
tional efficiency is served and goodwill investments are protected,
while perfect competition in the marketplace remains unscathed.2"
The federal trademark system, as derived from the Lanham
Act,22 achieves these ends by granting exclusivity to product symbols,
characteristics and features by which the goods of the producer may
be distinguished from all other similar goods."3 The system estab-
lishes a registration mechanism through which nationwide notice of
such exclusive rights is provided.24 In addition, section 43(a) of the
Act has been interpreted to incorporate state unfair competition doc-
trines, which similarly protect unregistered features from those who
knowingly use confusingly similar characteristics on their goods.2 5 As
mentioned previously, the Act has recently been amended to explic-
itly extend federal protection in this regard.2 6
Although the trademark system, like the patent and copyright
systems, is intended to curtail free ride problems, there is an essential
difference regarding trademark protection which, as shall be devel-
oped later, is often overlooked. Both patents and copyrights are
designed to provide incentives to develop the protected creation itself.
Patents do so by offering potential monopoly profits from the inven-
tion, while copyrights allow possible oligopoly returns. Under the
trademark system, however, the purpose of protecting identifying
features is not to provide manufacturers with the incentive to develop
those features. Rather, the incentives properly nurtured through this
system are toward investments in goodwill. Indeed, it is now clearly
established through economic analysis that it would be inefficient
and counterproductive to protect product features when there exists a
21. See Burgunder, Economic Approach, supra note 17, at 396.
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1150 (1982).
23. Id. §§ 1052, 1127.
24. Id. §§ 1072, 1115.
25. Id. § 1125(a). SK&F Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 625 F.2d
1055, 1065 (3d Cir. 1980); See, e.g., Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 647 F.
Supp. 1533, 1537 (D. Colo. 1986); LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 75 (2d
Cir. 1985); Stormy Clime, Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 974 (2d Cir. 1987); Prufrock,
Ltd., Inc. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 131 (8th Cir. 1986).
26. See Trademark Law, supra note 3, and accompanying text.
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possibility that supranormal returns (sometimes called "economic
rents") might be garnered solely because of attributes inherent in
those features.2" It follows, then, that it would be inappropriate to
rely on the trademark system to induce producers to create especially
attractive product features. This does not mean that protected char-
acteristics must be totally devoid of attractive or useful qualities.2 8
Rather, they cannot be more desirable than a multitude of other
identifying characteristics which potentially could be used by
competitors.
The Supreme Court has recognized the danger of allowing the
trademark system to protect product features under circumstances
that yield economic rents. Since trademark protection may be
everlasting,29 the patent and copyright laws, which have limited time
frames of protection, might be circumvented if profitable designs and
inventions could be perpetually insulated from competition by the
trademark system. Thus, the Court in the companion cases of Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co."0 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting Co.," forbade protection by state unfair competition laws
of product features that served more than identification purposes be-
cause such protection would be contrary to the federal intellectual
property incentive systems.
Although it can be argued that the federal trademark system is
exempt from this preemption-based ruling, this would not make for
coherent policy since there is no conceptual difference, outside of fed-
eral registration, between the federal trademark system and state un-
fair competition laws. 2 Therefore, when determining the potential
scope of protection offered by the federal trademark system, one
must be mindful of the interplay between the three intellectual prop-
erty systems in terms of the potential for long-term profits. In this
regard, a seller should never be entitled to trademark protection of a
product design, symbol or feature when such protection would pro-
vide a competitive advantage yielding supranormal profits.
27. For a thorough discussion of the concept of economic rents with regard to trade-
marks, see Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at 281-84.
28. W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 343 (7th Cir. 1985). See Landes & Pos-
ner, supra note 17, at 297-99. Cf Prufrock, 781 F.2d at 133 ("If an element of the trade dress
is unrelated to the consumer demand for the product and serves merely to identify the source of
the product, then a prohibition against imitation will not hinder honest competition.").
29. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058, 1059 (1982).
30. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
31. 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964).
32. See, e.g., Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78, 81 (3d Cir.
1982); SK&F Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, 625 F.2d 1055, 1065 (3d Cir. 1980).
[Vol. 29
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1. The Trademark Genericism Doctrine
The genericism doctrine provides one example of how the trade-
mark system polices itself. It has been thoroughly documented in the
economic literature that trademark protection of generic words, sym-
bols, or designs offers the potential for economic rents.88 A generic
symbol is defined as that name or characteristic which consumers
expect all products within the product class to possess. 4 If a seller
were entitled to the generic symbol it would enjoy certain marketing
advantages. For instance, shoppers who rely on the symbol to iden-
tify the relevant class of products for which they are searching may
be reluctant to consider competing brands which do not share the
symbol.35 For this reason, the Lanham Act has been interpreted to
forbid the registration of generic marks, and to otherwise deny them
protection. 6
A mark that becomes generic, no less than one that was initially
generic, offers the same advantages to its bearer."7 Therefore, the
Lanham Act provides for the withdrawal of protection from marks
that become generic.38 This process, coined "genericide," has been
made famous by the loss of protection for such notable names as
"aspirin," "thermos," "monopoly," and "trampoline."3 9 The generi-
cide process is one way in which the federal trademark system con-
tinuously ensures that its protections do not provide economic rents.
33. For a thorough economic analyses of generic marks, see Landes & Posner, supra
note 17, at 291-96; Burgunder, supra note 5, at 594-99; Burgunder, Economic Approach,
supra note 17, at 396-402; Folsom & Teply, supra note 17, at 1334-46.
34. See Burgunder, supra note 5, at 595. See, e.g., Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman
Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1977); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World,
Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
35. See Burgunder, Economic Approach, supra note 17, at 398-401; Burgunder, supra
note 5, at 594-99; Folsom & Teply, supra note 17, at 1334-46.
36. Registration under the Lanham Act is denied because only marks which may serve
to distinguish the goods of the applicant are subject to such registration. 15 U.S.C. § 1127
(1982). By definition, a generic trademark is not capable of this distinguishing function be-
cause it represents the entire product class. Likewise, section 43(a), by incorporating unfair
competition principles, offers no protection to generic marks.
37. See Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at 293-94; Burgunder, supra note 5, at 600-
01.
38. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1982) (provides that a petition to cancel a mark
may be filed "at any time if the registered mark becomes the common descriptive name of an
article or substance"). Similarly, unregistered marks may lose unfair competition protection
under section 43(a) if they become generic.
39. Bayer, Inc. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) ("Aspirin"); King-
Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963) ("Thermos"); Anti-Mo-
nopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1227 (1983) ("Monopoly"); Nissen Trampoline Co. v. American Trampoline Co.,
193 F. Supp 745 (S.D. Iowa 1961) ("Trampoline").
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Significantly, it does not matter whether the feature became generic
through conscious marketing efforts or through inexplicable shifting
demand patterns of consumers.40 Rather, the focus correctly centers
on the actual state of genericism and the possibility of economic rents
which it breeds.
2. The Trademark Functionality Doctrine
Besides restricting genericism, trademark law will not protect
product characteristics which are functional.41 As with the generi-
cism doctrine, this policy is designed to ensure that the trademark
laws do not enable businesses to garner economic rents.4 Thus, any
product marking or symbol which is functional can only be protected
by the patent or copyright systems.
Although not clearly articulated by the courts, functionality is
analyzed in three ways. 8 The first form of functionality can be
termed "supply functionality." Supply functionality refers to a prod-
uct feature which is cheaper to manufacture than a host of others
which could be used by competitors in making the product. To allow
a company exclusive control of that feature would provide it with an
economic advantage, and consequently with the means to earn eco-
nomic rents. Courts have had no difficulty in classifying instances of
supply functionality as being unworthy of trademark protection."'
40. Even companies that take careful steps to ensure that their marks do not become
generic will lose their exclusive rights to those marks if they become generic in spite of their
efforts. See King-Seeley, 321 F.2d at 579 ("[Wjhether the appropriation by the public was due
to highly successful educational and advertising campaigns or to lack of diligence in policing or
not is of no consequence .... "). This is economically appropriate because the market ineffi-
ciencies are the same no matter how the genericism was attained. See Posner & Landes, supra
note 17, at 291-96; Burgunder, supra note 5, at 601.
41. See, e.g., Stormy Clime, Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 974 (2d Cir. 1987);
Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1987); Sno-Wizard Mfg. v.
Eisemann Products Co., 791 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1986); In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,
774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985); LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71 (2d Cir.
1985); W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner
Toy Mfg., 685 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1982); Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., 644 F.2d 769
(9th Cir. 1981); Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, 647 F. Supp. 1533 (D. Colo.
1986).
42. See Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at 297-99; Burgunder, supra note 5, at 605-
13.
43. Burgunder, supra note 5, at 605-13.
44. See, e.g., Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844, 850-51 n.10
(1982) ("In general terms, a product feature is functional if ... it affects the cost or quality of
the article."); In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1341 (C.C.P.A. 1982);
Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 339 F. Supp. 973, 980 (M.D. Tenn. 1971),
af'd, 470 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1972) (functionality exists because other bicycle rim designs are
more complex and more expensive).
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The second form of functionality may be called "utility demand
functionality." This class of functionality includes product features
which customers prefer because they can fulfill their needs better
than others available to competitors. Protection of a feature with su-
perior utility would give the trademark holder a competitive advan-
tage solely from its exclusivity. Again, courts have recognized that
the benefits from utility demand functionality should properly be
achieved through copyright or patent protection. 5
The final class of functionality may be called "aesthetic demand
functionality." This refers to product features to which consumers
are drawn not because of how they work, but because of how they
look. Trademark protection of aesthetically pleasing designs is much
more controversial in the courts. Some consider aesthetics to be irrel-
evant in determining functionality;"" some prohibit protection of at-
tractive designs under any circumstances;' 7 still others deny protec-
tion only if the feature is more attractive than numerous others
which competitors might use."' From an economic standpoint, aes-
thetic demand functionality should be treated no differently than
utility demand functionality."' That is, companies should not be per-
mitted exclusive control of design features which consumers find
more pleasing than a large number of others available for use by
competitors. Otherwise, the inherent properties of the protected fea-
ture would enhance the salability of the product relative to others
which competitors might use. Such a competitive advantage is only
within the province of copyright or patent to offer.
E. Federal Intellectual Property Protection: Conclusion
The federal intellectual property laws comprise an integrated
tripartite system of protection. The patent laws protect product and
45. See, e.g., Inwood Laboratories, 456 U.S. at 850-51 (a functional feature "is essential
to the use or purpose of the article"); Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 429(5th Cir. 1984) ("To achieve the status of 'functional', a design or feature must be superior or
optimal in terms of engineering, economy of manufacture, or accommodation of utilitarian
function or performance."); Hartford House, 647 F. Supp. at 1538 ("The only product fea-
tures which should be classified as functional, therefore, are those utilitarian aspects which are
essential to the product's use.").
46. See, e.g., Sicilia, 732 F.2d at 429; Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822 (3d
Cir. 1981); Hartford House, 647 F. Supp. at 1538.
47. See, e.g., Prufrock, Ltd. v. Laseter, 781 F.2d 129, 131 (8th Cir. 1986); Int'l Order
of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1980).
48. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 519 (10th Cir. 1987);W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985); LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp.,
754 F.2d 71, 78 (2d Cir. 1985).
49. See Burgunder, supra note 5, at 609-13; Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at 297.
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design ideas and entitle holders to potential monopoly profits if strin-
gent requirements are met. Copyrights, by granting protection only
to the several ways in which an idea may be suitably expressed, be-
stow a lower level of profit incentive, somewhat akin to the expecta-
tions of oligopolists. At the bottom rung of the incentive ladder is the
trademark system, which offers no opportunity to reap economic
rents from product designs or characteristics.
Unquestionably, there is a symbiotic relationship between the
three components of the federal intellectual property system. In this
regard, the article next explores several analogies that can be drawn
between the copyright and trademark systems within the tripartite
relationship. For instance, the article demonstrates that a derivative
of the trademark functionality doctrine is already being used in copy-
right to determine the appropriate scope of protection in computer
technology cases. In conjunction, an argument is made that a form of
the genericide doctrine should be borrowed from the trademark sys-
tem for use in policing copyright laws. In addition, the article sug-
gests that insights may be elicited from the copyright idea-expression
spectrum in defining functionality under the trademark system. In
making these and other parallels, close attention is given to preserv-
ing the ultimate incentive objectives of the separate systems. As shall
be seen, courts and even the Congress have sometimes erred in this
endeavor.
III. THE APPLICABILITY OF TRADEMARK DOCTRINES TO
COPYRIGHT: THE COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY CASES
Copyright protects original expressions from unauthorized acts
of copying. To judge whether one work infringes on another alleg-
edly protected by copyright, a three-step process must be undertaken.
First, one must determine if there is an original expression capable
of protection. In this regard, the originality barrier is relatively easy
to hurdle because it is met merely by showing that there is some
spark of creativity.50 However, deciding whether the artistic elements
are expressions of ideas as opposed to the ideas themselves is a much
trickier enterprise. This decision is critical, because ideas enter the
public domain, and thus are free for all to copy. As shall be seen, the
idea-expression spectrum is an integral analytical tool in this
determination.
50. See, e.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir.
1951) (All that is required in terms of originality "is that the 'author' contributed something
more than a 'merely trivial' variation, something recognizably 'his own.' ").
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Second, once the protectable expressions are deciphered, one
must judge whether the allegedly infringing work was developed by
copying those expressions. Direct evidence of copying obviously
meets this step. However, such direct evidence often is not available.
In these situations, copying is established by dissecting out the un-
protectable ideas, and then determining whether aspects of the alter-
native work are substantially similar to the elements of expression."'
Expert and nonexpert testimony generally is admissible in this
evaluation.5"
Third, assuming copying is proven, the court must consider
whether the existence of the alternative work will decrease the re-
wards from the protected work. Given that copyright is designed to
provide incentives to the artist, one must evaluate the work in terms
of competitive realities." Will consumers purchase the alternative
work instead of the protected work? The question as to competitive
impact is usually answered by another substantial similarity deter-
mination. This inquiry focuses on nonexpert impressions about the
overall "look and feel" of the alternative work as compared with that
of the copyrighted expressions." In computer technology cases, due
to the complicated nature of the subject matter, this third look and
feel step is incorporated into the second substantial similarity step. In
this way, once the protectable expressions are dissected, their look
and feel are compared to the alternative work by experts and nonex-
perts." If the look and feel are substantially similar, infringement is
51. See, e.g., Digital Communications Assocs. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp.
449 (N.D. Ga. 1987) ("Because copying is ordinarily impossible to prove by direct evidence, it
is usually proven indirectly by evidence of a defendant's access to the copyrighted work and
substantial similarity between the plaintiff's and the defendant's work.").
52. See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946); Whelan Assocs.
v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories, 797 F.2d 1222, 1232 (3d Cir. 1986).
53. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S 417, 450 (1984)
("[A] use that has no demonstrable effect upon the potential market for, or the value of, the
copyrighted work need not be prohibited in order to protect the author's incentive to create.");
Note, Copyright Infringement Actions: The Proper Role of Audience Reactions in Determin-
ing Substantial Similarity, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 392-94 (1981).
54. See, e.g., Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1232; Cooling Systems & Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart
Radiator, Inc. 777 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1985); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. Mc-
Donald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977).
55. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1233 ("We therefore join the growing number of courts
which do not apply the ordinary observer test in copyright cases involving exceptionally diffi-
cult materials, like computer programs, but instead adopt a single substantial similarity in-
quiry according to which lay and expert testimony would be admissible."); Data East USA,
Inc. v. Epyx, 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Plaintiff's copyright has been infringed by de-
fendant's game in that defendant's game unlawfully appropriates the total feel and concept of
plaintiff's game.").
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established.
The complexity of computer copyright cases has led some courts
to misapply the look and feel step. Although they take the time to
dissect the ideas from the expressions, they then apply the look and
feel analysis to the entire work, rather than just to the expressions."
However, the whole point of differentiating the ideas is to recognize
which elements can be freely used by competitors. Establishing lia-
bility in this way, based on similarities which the competitor, by
right, is allowed to share, subverts the copyright system. The unfor-
tunate result is that the copyright system may unwittingly prevent
others from offering products due to their use of unpatented ideas.
Interestingly, as shall be discussed in part IV of this article, some
courts have likewise misapplied the functionality doctrine in trade-
mark cases by analyzing the similarity of products in terms of both
functional and nonfunctional features. Again, the result may be t6
allow companies exclusive use of product characteristics which all
competitors should be entitled to offer.
A. The Idea-Expression Spectrum: Levels of Abstraction
Since copyright protection extends only to expressions, and in
no instance includes ideas, one must distinguish the idea within a
work from the expression of that idea in order to determine the
reach of copyright. This task is not as easy as one might think at
first blush, because for every work there exists a wide spectrum of
possible ways to delineate an idea from its expression. Judge
Learned Hand described how literary works are subject to this phe-
nomenon as follows:
Upon any work . . . a great number of patterns of increasing
generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the inci-
dent is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most
general statement of what the work is about, and at times con-
sists only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstrac-
tions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the
[author] could prevent the use of his 'ideas,' to which, apart
from their expression, his property is never extended.5"
Judge Hand correctly observed that the idea of any work may
56. See Data East, 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1988). See also McCulloch v. Albert E.
Price, Inc., 823 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1987); Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 901 (9th
Cir. 1987) ("similarity of expression exists only when the 'total concept and feel' of the works
is substantially similar").
57. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930)
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be formulated along a continuum, ranging in terms of its abstraction,
without any logical determinant of the proper abstraction level. For
example, consider the script of the movie "E.T." At its least abstract
level, the idea of this movie is to tell a story about a cute-in-its-own-
way creature from outer space which is found by adorable children
who hide the creature from mystified adults, help it communicate
with its friends on the spaceship, learn of the creature's impending
demise in earth's atmosphere, escape from pursuing scientists by the
creature's magic, and tearfully say good-bye in the woods. At this
level, the expression only consists of the exact words to tell the tale.
More abstractly, the idea is about a creature from outer space which
is found by children who help it to return home. Here, the expres-
sion encompasses more of the plot sequence, such as the seclusion
from parents, the health concerns and the miraculous retreat from
the scientists.
Continuing along the spectrum, the idea might be to tell a story
about an alien, or even more abstractly, to tell a story. In the latter
case, the entire plot, including the concept of an alien, is expression.
The issue, of course, is deciding which abstraction is relevant, be-
cause the author's degree of protection is profoundly affected by the
choice. The more abstract the idea, the more expression that is pro-
tectable by copyright.
The levels of abstraction problem is no less real in the computer
technology context." Consider a possible spectrum for a word
processing program, ranging from a low abstraction level to increas-
ingly higher levels:
A. The idea is to create an efficient word processing program,
marketable to a defined set of purchasers, that interacts with the
user and manipulates data in a particular fashion, using a par-
ticular logic framework, which includes not only a particular
structure, sequence and organization, but also particular algo-
rithms and subroutines. The expression is the exact code only.
B. The idea is to create an efficient word processing program,
marketable to a defined set of purchasers, that interacts with the
user and manipulates data in a particular fashion, using a par-
ticular logic framework, which includes the particular structure,
sequence and organization. The expression consists of the code,
58. For thorough discussions of copyright in the context of high technology, see
Burgunder & Heckman, An Emerging Theory of Computer Software Genericism, 2 HIGH
TECH. L.J. 229 (1987); Pinheiro & LaCroix, Protecting the 'Look and Feel' of Computer
Software, I HIGH TECH. L.J. 411 (1986); Note, supra note 11, at 747; Note, Defining the
Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Software, 38 STAN. L. REv. 197 (1986).
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algorithms, and subroutines.
C. The idea is to create an efficient word processing program,
marketable to a defined set of purchasers. The structure, se-
quence and organization of the program, as well as the methods
of data manipulation and user interaction, are the expression.
D. The idea is to create an efficient word processing program.
In this abstraction, customer appeal is not a component of the
idea.
E. The idea is to create an efficient program. Word processing
itself is protectable expression."
In the highly competitive world of computer techn.ology, the de-
termination of the appropriate abstraction level can mean the differ-
ence between profitability and bankruptcy. Program creators favor
abstraction level E, while those that wish to build on previous devel-
opments prefer level A. Unfortunately, courts have had to make their
selections in the novel and unfamiliar territory of high technology
without coherent guidance from the more familiar worlds of art and
literature."0 Therefore, they have sought principles which yield the
proper result.
Recent cases in the computer technology arena suggest that
courts are opting for a high level of abstraction, thereby abiding by
the wishes of developers.6 1 Specifically, the trend is to settle on ab-
straction level D. For instance, the landmark case of Whelan Associ-
ates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories held that the idea is the purpose
or function of the program while the expression is everything that is
not necessary to the function of the program, including structure,
sequence and organization.6 Fortunately, in selecting level D, the
courts have not totally neglected the purposes of copyright in the
tripartite intellectual property system.
59. Burgunder & Heckman, supra note 58, at 237.
60. See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d
607, 615 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982) ("There is no litmus paper test by
which to apply the idea-expression distinction; the determination is necessarily subjective.");
Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) ("the
decisions will "inevitably be ad hoc").
61. See Frybarger v. IBM, 812 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1987); Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow
Dental Laboratories, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986); Atari, 672 F.2d at 615; Data East USA,
Inc. v. Epyx, 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1988); Digital Communications Assocs. v. Softklone
Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987); Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison
World, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986)
62. 797 F.2d at 1236.
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B. Functionality and Genericism in Copyright
The copyright system was conceived to provide artists with suf-
ficient incentives to create without allowing them to attain monopoly
status in the marketplace. The idea-expression dichotomy concep-
tually achieves this goal because ideas usually can be expressed in
several equally suitable ways. However, as the idea becomes more
abstract, the range of options for potential competitors decreases. For
instance, if level E is selected, the first developer to copyright a word
processing program may face no competition from other word
processing programs because, in the context of all computer pro-
grams, every subsequent word processing program may seem sub-
stantially similar to the original. Assuming that word processing is a
relevant competitive market, this developer will enjoy monopoly
profits." Thus, there is a point in the levels of abstraction where the
creator is compensated to a degree that should only be attained by a
patent. In this event, a lower abstraction level is appropriate.
To account for the potential availability of monopoly profits
from an abstraction level that is too high, courts have utilized the
multiple expressions test as a check.6 That is, courts will not grant
protection at the hypothesized level of abstraction if the idea may be
expressed in only one or a few ways.65 In this manner, courts cor-
rectly hope to maintain an oligopolistic return from the copyright
without raising the prospect of monopoly profits.
Although the multiple expressions test is doctrinally an appro-
priate vehicle to restrict excessive returns, it has not been consistently
applied by the courts because they do not clearly understand its com-
ponents. What the multiple expressions test strives to do is to locate
those instances where protection of artistic features will put potential
competitors at such a disadvantage that they will be unable to mean-
ingfully affect the pricing decisions of the benefited firm. What fol-
lows is a demonstration that this inquiry is closely associated with
the functionality doctrine used in trademark law. However, unlike
63. A monopoly can be established only with reference to a defined competitive market.
Derivation of this market is a controversial enterprise. The principles employed in antitrust
law to define the market should be carried over to the copyright and trademark laws. Thus,
the relevant product market should be assessed in terms of cross-elasticity of demand, ease of
entry, and similar factors. The geographic market should be established in terms of buyer-
supplier relationships. See infra note 72.
64. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236 n.28; Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
65. See Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1237 (Factual works have limited copyright coverage be-
cause "there are only a limited number of ways to express factual material .... ").
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the doctrine in trademark law, wherein protection inures only if it
will result in zero economic rents, here protection should be permit-
ted as long as there are sufficient competitive possibilities to prevent
monopoly returns.
Potential competitors may be unreasonably disadvantaged by
copyright protection in various ways. First, the expression under
consideration may be the most efficient way to express the idea,
given the abstraction level. That is, alternative expressions of the
idea, if they exist at all, may be more expensive to design. For in-
stance, assume that the idea is to create a sculpture, and one artist is
given protection for a rusted three-dimensional form. Other artists
may be at a disadvantage if precluded from making rusty forms, be-
cause all other forms must be treated to withstand the elements. This
in turn might add significantly to the expenses of those artists,
thereby reducing their ability to meaningfully compete.66 Thus, the
level of abstraction should be lowered so that the idea is to create a
rusted sculpture.
Similarly, in the computer realm, it may be that certain algo-
rithms are indispensable to the achievement of the abstracted objec-
tive, or that one program can be developed at a lower cost than most
other alternatives.6" This inquiry directly mirrors the supply func-
tionality doctrine used in the trademark system. The only difference
is that in the trademark application there must be more equally effi-
cient means to design the product than are required in copyright to
express the idea.
Competitors will also be unfairly disadvantaged by copyright
protection of a work if that work best meets the needs of the consum-
ing public. In other words, if those in the relevant competitive mar-
ket have a marked preference for the protected item because it is
somehow more useful to them than feasible alternatives, the copy-
66. See generally Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1879) (form held to be an idea
because there were no other ways to express an accounting idea); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry
Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971) (design of jeweled bee pin held to be
an idea because there were no alternative ways to express the idea). In both of these cases,
"supply functionality" was present because the idea could be supplied in only one way.
67. See Frybarger v. IBM, 812 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1987); Digital Communications As-
socs. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987) ("The defendants have
never contended that they could not have arranged the parameters/commands in a wide variety
of patterns without hampering the operation of their program."). See also Whelan, 797 F.2d
at 1238 (the existence of two other programs on the market proves that the subject program is
not essential to the task). It is not clear whether the Whelan court was focusing on "supply
functionality" or "utility demand functionality" in this regard. These programs may have sug-
gested that consumers did not find the subject program to be more efficient in operations. See
infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
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right holder will be insulated from the types of competition appro-
priate for copyright. Such a concept parallels the utility demand
functionality doctrine employed in trademark law, and some courts
have acknowledged its importance. For instance, in Whelan Associ-
ates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories, the court allowed copyright pro-
tection, partly because the defendant had not persuasively demon-
strated that other potential file structures were less efficient in
carrying out the business operations of a dental lab." It also noted
that two other programs were on the market.69 This may have sug-
gested to the court that these other programs equally met the needs
of consumers.
Similarly, in Plains Cotton Co-op v. Goodpasture Computer
Service, the Fifth Circuit refused protection to a cotton information
computer system because it presented cotton information in the man-
ner that the relevant purchasers most desired. ° However, other cir-
cuits have refused to consider the relevance of utility demand func-
tionality. For example, the Third Circuit, in Apple Computer v.
Franklin Computer Corp., stated that commercial and competitive
objectives do not enter into the metaphysical issue of whether partic-
ular expressions serve as ideas."
Utility demand functionality must be analyzed if courts are go-
ing to ensure that the selected abstraction level does not lead to un-
reasonable profits from copyright protection. In undertaking the in-
quiry, the courts must first define the relevant competitive market.
As with antitrust law, this requires an analysis of the appropriate set
of buyers and the proper geographical area.7 Many courts have im-
68. 797 F.2d at 1243 n.43.
69. Id. at 1238.
70. 807 F.2d 1256, 1263 (5th Cir. 1987). The concept of utility demand functionality
also explains why historical accounts are not given copyright protection. See, e.g., Hoehling v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 974, 979 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841
(1980). Consumers would not find any other account but the truth to meet their needs.
71. 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983).
72. The methods to determine the relevant competitive product market were summa-
rized by the Supreme Court in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962):
The outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable
interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product
itself and substitutes for it. However, within this broad market, well defined
submarkets may exist which, in themselves, constitute product markets for anti-
trust purposes. The boundaries of such a submarket may be determined-by ex-
amining such practical indicia as industry or public recognition of the sub-
market as a separate economic entity, the product's peculiar characteristics and
uses, unique production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity
to price changes, and specialized vendors.
Id. at 325. The relevant geographic market "depends upon the geographic structure of sup-
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plicitly done this. In Whelan, the court focused on dentists,"3 and in
Plains Cotton, it confined itself to cotton growers and marketers."'
However, in Broderbund Software v. Unison World, a district court
found competitive potential in programs customizing greeting cards
because there existed an alternative program on the market called
Stickybear printer which performed the same functions as the subject
program, The Print Shop.75 Whether these two programs were
designed to be marketed to the same audience was not clearly ob-
served by the court. For instance, it may be that one was targeted to
children while the other was aimed at adults. Therefore, the copy-
right system would be better served by a more explicit and rigorous
analysis of the relevant markets. Especially when the courts are
leaning toward a highly abstract level of protection, they must seri-
ously consider the full implications of protection on competition.
This requires the type of attention already used in antitrust cases.
Once the courts have determined the relevant set of buyers and
area of competition, they must analyze the ability of alternative ex-
pressions to efficiently meet the needs of those purchasers. The num-
ber of required alternatives is open to debate, and this article does
not address the issue beyond noting that the number is less than that
demanded in the trademark system. However, the existence of one or
two programs, although probative, should not be dispositive. For in-
stance, it is possible that the other programs were on the market
before the introduction of the more efficient one, thereby making
their continued viability suspect.
The final area of functionality which must be addressed in com-
puter copyright cases is aesthetic demand functionality. Here, the is-
sue is whether the expression is preferred by the relevant consuming
population for reasons other than utility. This aspect is just as im-
portant as utility demand functionality because it impacts the ability
of alternative expressions to be successfully marketed as competitors.
Unfortunately, this concern is sometimes ignored by the courts in
computer cases. One striking example is presented by Digital Com-
munications Associates v. Softklone Distributing Corp.7  In this
plier-customer relations." United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 357 (1963).
73. 797 F.2d 1238 (3d Cir. 1986).
74. Plains, 807 F.2d at 1258. See also Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 902
(9th Cir. 1987) ("Because children are the intended market for the dolls, we must factor the
intrinsic inquiry through the perception of children.")
75. 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1132 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
76. See Burgunder & Heckman, supra note 58, at 239.
77. 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
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case, the court noted that one of the prime reasons that the plaintiff's
program received such widespread public support was because of its
distinctively designed status screen. 8 However, copyright protection
was extended because there were several other equally efficient ways
to present information on a screen.7 The court erred in not pursuing
further whether those other screens would be marketable. It is possi-
ble, for example, that the plaintiff's screen had become so widely
accepted as a standard that consumers would not be attracted to
alternatives.80
Somewhat related to the application of aesthetic demand func-
tionality in copyright cases is the doctrine of genericism. For exam-
ple, using the Softklone facts, consumers might not be attracted to
alternative screen displays because they are not readily aware that
the alternatives perform the same functions. Rather than undertak-
ing search costs to learn about the other methods, consumers might
opt for the program having the generic features with which they are
comfortable. This mirrors the genericism problem of trademarks,
and it engenders the same potentially harmful effects. In essence, a
generic feature should be treated as an idea which is not protected by
copyright.8
Some courts, in trademark cases, have made the connection be-
tween demand functionality and genericism.' 2 For instance, in
Prufrock Ltd., Inc. v. Lasater, the district court denied protection to
certain restaurant features having clear commercial appeal because
"by protecting the trade dress that creates the concept, this court
would be protecting the concept itself."83 Also, in United States Golf
Association v. St. Andrews Systems, Data-Max, trade dress protec-
tion was not bestowed on a golf handicap formula because that
78. Id. at 452.
79. Id. at 455.
80. See Burgunder & Heckman, supra note 58, at 244.
81. See Burgunder & Heckman, supra note 58, at 246. That scenes a faire are not
afforded copyright protection can be understood in terms of genericism principles. See, e.g.,
Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
841 (1980). Such scenes are those stock or standard devices that consumers expect in the treat-
ment of a given topic.
82. The connection between genericism and protectability has been noted in copyright
cases as well. For instance, courts give more protection to "fanciful" and "imaginative" expres-
sions than to those that are common. See Atari, Inc. v. North American Consumer Elec. Corp.,
672 F.2d 607, 617-18 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Data East USA, Inc. v.
Epyx, 862 F.2d 204, 209 (9th Cir. 1988). This mirrors the spectrum of protection in trade-
mark which ranges from common or generic names, which receive no protection, to descriptive,
arbitrary, and then to fanciful and imaginative names which receive the greatest protection.
See, e.g., Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9-11 (2d Cir. 1976).
83. 781 F.2d 129, 134 (8th Cir. 1986).
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formula had become a standard in the industry.84 As the court cor-
rectly observed, "[tio allow a monopoly over such a standard would
defeat the policy of fostering competition that underlies the function-
ality doctrine."8
It should be noted that when extending trademark genericism
principles to copyright, it makes no difference why the feature is
generic or how it became so. Thus, if an expression is the first to be
marketed and becomes the industry standard through its sole use by
consumers, protection should be lost even though no conscious mar-
keting efforts were made to predispose consumers to the concept.
This can be analogized to the application of genericide principles to
trademarks which once designated the source of patented goods.86
Here, the mark becomes generic because of its association with the
only available product in its class. Likewise, companies should lose
protection of expressions if their marketing efforts lead consumers to
believe that available alternatives are so distinctly different that they
are not even in the same class. Such principles simply follow the
classic genericide approach.8
In sum, courts may be providing developers with too much pro-
tection from the .copyright system by working with the wrong ab-
straction level. At a minimum, courts should move from abstraction
level D to abstraction level C. In this way, both efficiency (in the
supply and demand sense) and marketability are acknowledged as
components of the idea. This will result in the proper application of
the multiple expressions test, which will in turn preserve the appro-
priate level of incentives from the copyright system.
IV. THE APPLICABILITY OF COPYRIGHT DOCTRINES TO
TRADEMARK: THE TRADE DRESS CASES
The most important recent developments in trademark law
probably include the expansive protection granted to a product's con-
figuration, or as it is often called, its trade dress, through section
43(a) of the federal trademark statute.88 Such protection leads to a
84. 749 F.2d 1028, 1034 (3d Cir. 1984).
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) ("aspirin");
Haughton Elevator Co. v. Seeberger, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 80 (Comm. Pat. 1950)
("Escalator").
87. See, e.g., King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577, 579 (2d Cir.
1963) (The word "thermos," although fanciful when first registered, became generic over time,
partly due to marketing efforts by the registrant. Thus, the word, with limited restrictions,
became free for all competitors to use.).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). Section 43(a) also protects services, such as sales tech-
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potential disruption of the tripartite federal intellectual property
scheme because different product features can be viewed as alterna-
tive expressions of the product idea. Thus, without care, the trade-
mark system could offer exclusivity to creations which should only be
protected by the copyright or patent systems.
A. Incentives For Creative Product Designs
The trademark system is designed to reduce search costs and
reward investments in goodwill.89 Distributional efficiency is fur-
thered when the system achieves these goals without bestowing
supranormal profits. On the other hand, when the system allows a
company to derive profits from its exclusive rights to the protected
feature, the costs to society may outweigh the benefits. Therefore, to
ensure that the system achieves its objectives, protection should be
granted only when there is no potential for supranormal returns. As
previously discussed, the functionality doctrine, as well as genericism
principles, were developed in trademark law to obtain this result.
Unfortunately, a very threatening trend appears to be emerging.
Several courts have articulated that it is proper for the trademark
system not only to improve efficiency, but also to provide incentives
toward the creation of attractive product designs. For instance, a
Colorado district court held that "one salutary purpose of the Lan-
ham Act . . . is to protect a creative artist's rights in his or her
creation and thus provide incentive to be creative. '"90 Also, in Bruns-
wick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., the Tenth Circuit criticized one ver-
sion of the aesthetic demand functionality doctrine because "it would
be a disincentive to creative design ... ."' Similarly, the Ninth
Circuit, in Fabrica, Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., announced that "[t]his
court . . . has specifically rejected the notion that a design feature is
functional by definition if it increases appeal and sales of the prod-
uct."" However, permitting the trademark system to provide incen-
tives to creativity or to increase the relative salability of a product is
niques. See cases cited supra note 2. See also Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy
Loft, 684 F.2d 821 (11th Cir. 1982) (adoption techniques associated with doll deemed
protectable).
89. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
90. Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, 647 F. Supp. 1533, 1540 (D. Colo.
1986).
91. 832 F.2d 513, 518 (10th Cir. 1987). See also LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754
F.2d 71, 77 (2d. Cir. 1985) ("A related difficulty with the 'important ingredient' formulation,
read literally, is that it provides a disincentive for development of imaginative and attractive
design.").
92. 697 F.2d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 1983).
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tantamount to having it confer supranormal profits.
A correct formulation of the role of trademarks with regard to
attractive designs is provided in W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene.9" Judge
Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, stated that trademarks may
protect an attractive product feature as long as there are sufficient
equally desirable alternatives such that effective competition will not
be impaired.9 This does not mean that the system is providing an
incentive to the creative act. Indeed, the fact that an economic advan-
tage is not obtained precludes the possibility. Rather, it simply
means that "it would be unreasonable to deny trademark protection
to a manufacturer who had the good fortune to have created a . . .
design that became valued by the consuming public for its intrinsic
pleasingness," unless that design were more pleasing than available
alternatives.95
That courts are allowing the trademark system to provide in-
centives toward creative product designs may be, in part, a conse-
quence of frustration with copyright law. Given the spectrum of pro-
tection provided by the intellectual property systems, copyrights or
design patents are the appropriate vehicles for conferring such incen-
tives. However, the patent process may be too costly for these types
of product creations. If forced to rely on a patent to protect the crea-
tion, the manufacturer might not invest in the creative efforts at all.
Thus, the manufacturer must depend on the copyright system if it
expects any rewards from creativity. The problem is that copyrights
protect designs "that can be identified separately from, and are capa-
ble of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the arti-
cle." 96 Since product designs are not separable in this way, the stat-
ute offers them no protection.97 Therefore, investments in these
product designs might be stifled altogether unless another means,
such as the trademark system, is extended to protect them.
Nevertheless, allowing the trademark system to provide incen-
93. 778 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985).
94. Id. at 340, 346.
95. Id. at 340 (emphasis added).
96. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
97. See, e.g., Fabrica, Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1983).
For a thorough discussion of the design separability issue in copyright, see Brown, Design
Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1344-55 (1987). On the other hand, some
courts, in trademark cases, consider product designs to be the equivalent of packaging, thereby
implying that the design is somehow separable. See, e.g., Stormy Clime, Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc.,
809 F.2d 971, 974 (2d Cir. 1987) ("ITIhe design of a product may function as its 'packaging',
thereby entitling the manufacturer to trade dress protection for the appearance of the prod-
uct."); LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1985); Harlequin Enter-
prises, Ltd. v. Gulf & Western Corp., 644 F.2d 946, 949 (2d Cir. 1981).
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tives toward creative investments should not be tolerated, regardless
of the reasons. Such a result skews the tripartite system. A future
consequence, based on the precedents set in the product configuration
cases, may be that both the trademark and copyright systems will
simultaneously be capable of protecting creations under circum-
stances yielding supranormal profits. However, as between the two,
copyright would be the least important form of protection since that
offered by the trademark is both longer and stronger. 98 Thus, the
copyright system may be eclipsed by trademark.9"
The courts should not use the trademark system to correct pos-
sible deficiencies in copyright law. If, indeed, this is the motivation
behind the protection now being permitted, it would be better to re-
turn the trademark system to its proper role and put the burden on
Congress to revise the copyright statute."° Such an amendment
would permit companies to obtain copyrights on original product
configurations, even when the features are not separable from the
utilitarian aspects of the article. This move would not be unprece-
dented. For instance, Congress already has amended the copyright
statute to allow for protection of computer programs, 01 although it
is difficult to conceive of how a program is separable from the opera-
tion of the machine. Thus, it would be a small step for Congress to
make the same extension to product configurations.
B. Functionality: Parallels with Copyright
The goal of the trademark functionality doctrine, when cor-
rectly applied with reference to all three of its possible forms, is to
ensure that a company's exclusive rights to a product design or fea-
98. Trademark protection may last perpetually, and it guards against both instances of
copying and those of independent creation.
99. See generally Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, 647 F. Supp. 1533, 1537
(D. Colo. 1986) (trademark protection for greeting card designs).
100. It is possible that some courts would have moved in this direction even without the
copyright bar to protection. For example, some courts offer more protection to product packag-
ing than to product designs. See Fabrica, 697 F.2d at 895; Audio Fidelity, Inc. v. High Fidel-
ity Recordings, 283 F.2d 551 (1960). This cannot be explained under the text's hypothesis
since packaging, unlike product designs, theoretically can be protected by copyright. Bills deal-
ing with the protection of product designs have been introduced repeatedly in Congress. See
Brown, supra note 97, at 1395. The most recent bill is modeled on copyright protection. See
Brown, supra note 97, at 1398.
101. In 1980, Congress amended the Copyright Act by adding "computer program" to
section 101, which defines terms used in the Act. Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified
at 7 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)). Legislative history of the Copyright Act suggests that a computer
program is protected as a "literary work." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5659, 5667.
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ture does not allow it to earn supranormal profits."' 2 The doctrine is
properly incorporated into trademark protection analysis in the fol-
lowing way. First, the functional elements of the trademark should
be dissected. These are the components which, based on supply func-
tionality, utility demand functionality and aesthetic demand func-
tionality, would give the manufacturer a comparative advantage over
numerous competitors because there are insufficient viable and dis-
tinctly different alternatives. As shall be seen, the determination of
the functional aspects actually parallels the idea-expression test in
copyright law. Next, the defendant's product should be compared to
the plaintiff's to determine if it is confusingly similar. As with copy-
right law, this comparison should be carried out while ignoring the
dissected functional parts. However, in trademark law as in copy-
right, the courts mishandle this step.
Suppose a company wants section 43(a) protection from imita-
tion for a pear shaped bag with a zipper on the side. The first task is
determining what components of this bag are functional. As with
ideas and expressions in copyright, there are several possible ways to
conceptually discriminate between the functional "product ideas"
and the nonfunctional "expressive" features, ranging from least to
most abstract. For example, the pear shaped bag could be analyzed
for functionality on any of the following levels:
A. A bag of any shape, including pear shaped, with a zipper in
any location, including on the side, is functional. Other elements
of this bag must serve the trademark purpose.
B. A bag of any shape, including pear shaped, with a zipper is
functional. A zipper positioned on top also is functional. A zip-
per on the side, but not the existence of a zipper, may serve a
trademark purpose because it is not on top.
C. A bag of any shape, including pear shaped, with a zipper is
functional. A zipper on the side, but not the existence of a zip-
per, may serve a trademark purpose. This would have been true
even had the zipper been on top.
D. A bag having certain shapes, with a zipper is functional.
The pear shaped bag may serve a trademark purpose if it is not
one of those certain shapes. A zipper may serve a trademark
purpose as in C.
E. A bag with a zipper is functional. The pear shaped bag, but
not the existence of the bag, and a zipper on the side, but not
102. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
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the existence of a zipper, may serve trademark purposes.
F. A bag is functional. Everything besides the existence of the
bag may serve a trademark purpose. This includes the existence
of a zipper on the bag.
G. A means of portage is functional. Everything, including that
the item is a bag and that it has a zipper, may serve a trade-
mark purpose.
As with copyright, there is a division of interests regarding
which level is appropriate. The manufacturer of the pear shaped bag
is most protected by abstraction level G, while competitors have the
most freedom with level A. Moreover, there is no magical way to
choose the appropriate level. In a trend similar to that in copyright,
courts have been using increasingly more abstract levels, thereby al-
lowing more of the product to receive protection. For instance, only
technical marks once received protection from the trademark system,
while now various features of the product design, including its shape,
components and color may acquire exclusivity.10 3
As courts increase the level of abstraction, they must ensure that
there are sufficient competitors at the selected level so that the pro-
tection offered does not entitle manufacturers to supranormal profits.
Thus, the analysis is very similar to that used in copyright cases.
The only difference is that there should be a wider set of alternative
possibilities which are not confusingly similar to each other.
As with copyright, the effect on competition cannot be properly
measured without first determining the relevant competitive market.
Most courts implicitly perform this step, although with little analyti-
cal rigor. For instance, in Hartford House Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards,
the court defined the product market, without justification, as the
"emotionally expressive non-occasion greeting card market." 1  Like-
wise, in Stormy Clime Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc., functionality was con-
103. Trademark law once only protected marks which identified the source of the prod-
uct with a technical symbol. See, e.g., In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116,
1119 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("This [provision] was a departure from the past, as prior statutes only
permitted registration of 'technical' common law trademarks."); Hanover Star Milling Co. v.
Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916) ("The primary and proper function of a trademark is to
identify the origin or ownership of the article to which it is affixed."). Now a wide range of
product features are protectable, including color, Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1116 ("pink");
shapes, In re Mogen David, 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964), aff d, 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A.
1967) ("decanter shaped wine container"); packaging, In re Swift & Co., 223 F.2d 950
(C.C.P.A. 1955) ("polka dot bands on packaging"); and sales techniques, Original Appalach-
ian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, 684 F.2d 821 (11th Cir. 1982) ("adoption techniques associ-
ated with doll").
104. 647 F. Supp. 1533, 1536 (D. Colo. 1986).
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sidered with respect to the needs of golfers.'"" Similarly, the Second
Circuit, in LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., apparently defined the
market as all bags, with little discussion of the possibility of smaller
relevant submarkets, such as lightweight nylon bags with a Parisian
flair.'0 6
Once the competitive market is defined, the selected abstraction
level can be evaluated with reference to it. For instance, the Hall-
mark Cards court selected a highly abstract level by concluding that
the functional elements of greeting cards are paper, verse and ink."' 7
The issue is whether protection of the other elements used by the
plaintiff would bestow upon it a competitive advantage over other
sellers in servicing the emotionally expressive nonoccasion greeting
card market, given that the only direct similarity to be permitted in
their cards is the use of paper, verse and ink. If certain features are
necessary for effective competition in the relevant market, the court
should use a less abstract level which includes those items as func-
tional. These, then, would be free for all competitors to use. Interest-
ingly, the district court did not consider any other elements of these
cards to be functional, in spite of evidence that greeting card sales
result from impulse purchases based on the cards' content and
design."0 8
The Second Circuit carefully performed this analysis in Stormy
Clime. It first hypothesized a somewhat abstract level by defining
functionality as items to keep golfers dry, free to move and comforta-
ble during rain showers.' 9 However, it judged that trademark pro-
tection of shingles and vents in particular locations on jackets, high-
sheen waterproof fabrics and hoods would give the plaintiff an ad-
vantage in marketing to golfers." 0 Therefore, the court moved to a
less abstract level, including these items as functional. It also ques-
tioned whether any shingled rain jacket would not appear confus-
ingly similar, thereby indicating that a less abstract level might be
105. 809 F.2d 971, 976 (2d Cir. 1987).
106. 754 F.2d 71, 76 (2d Cir. 1985). The court seemed to raise the possibility that the
bag defined its own product market ("Are consumers likely to purchase a LeSportsac bag
rather than that of a competitor principally because they find LeSportsac's particular combina-
tion of design features aesthetically pleasing . . .?"). Id. at 78
107. 647 F. Supp. 1533, 1540 (D. Colo. 1986).
108. Hartford House, 647 F. Supp. at 1544.
109. Stormy, 809 F.2d at 976 (The purpose of the product is "to keep golfers dry, free
to move, and comfortable during rain showers, all at low cost.").
110. Id. ("[Tihe arrangement of the principal features common to both . . . rainjack-
ets-shingles/vents, high sheen waterproof fabric and hood-appear to be dictated by the pur-
pose of providing a low-cost, unencumbering, waterproof jacket for wear while playing golf
and other sports.").
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required."'
However, this circuit was less cautious in its analysis in
LeSportsac, where the court indicated that certain design features of
LeSportsac's bag, such as the hollow rectangular zipper pull, cotton
carpet tape and use of a repeating logo might be functional." 2 Later,
however, it claimed that the defendant could have used solid or
nonrectangular zippers to differentiate its bag."' Why, though,
should the defendant do these things if the items are functional, and
thus free for it to use? Furthermore, the court failed to strictly con-
sider whether the locations or particular combinations of these ele-
ments might be functional. Conceivably the use of hollow zippers is
so overpowering that most bags using such zippers, no matter where
located or how shaped, would seem confusingly similar. On a posi-
tive note, the court did correctly acknowledge the importance of aes-
thetic demand functionality by instructing the trial court to deter-
mine whether consumers prefer the LeSportsac bag primarily
because it is aesthetically pleasing."" Similarly, the trial court
should determine whether the combination of bag features are some-
how preferred because they have become generic, thereby making the
bag a product class in and of itself. If either of these are the case, as
with the other instances just listed, a less abstract level of functional-
ity is appropriate.
C. Substantial Similarity: Parallels with Copyright
Once the proper level of functionality has been identified, it is
necessary to consider whether consumers would be confused as to the
source of the defendant's product because it has features which are
substantially similar to those of the plaintiff's good." 3 This compari-
son should be undertaken with the functional elements factored out
of the analysis. After all, the inquiry into functional features occurs
under the theory that they can be freely imitated unless protected by
another federal system." 6 However, some courts, after taking the
time to judge functionality, test substantial similarity withoutiremov-
111. Id. at 978 ("In the instant case, the District Court does not appear to have consid-
ered whether any feasible shingled rainjacket could be manufactured that would not appear
similar in key respects to Stormy Clime's COOL IT rainjacket.").
112. 754 F.2d 71, 76 (2d Cir. 1985).
113. Id. at 77.
114. Id. at 78.
115. See, e.g., Sno-Wizard Mfg. v. Eisemann Prods. Corp., 791 F.2d 423 (5th Cir.
1986); Sicilia D. R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 425 (5th Cir. 1984); Hartford
House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, 647 F. Supp. 1533, 1537 (D. Colo. 1986).
116. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
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ing the functional elements. For instance, in Hartford House Ltd. v.
Hallmark Cards, the court rejected dissection "as alien to the poli-
cies of the Lanham Act." 11 Rather, it preferred an "aggregate ap-
proach to deciding the functionality question," 1 8 wherein functional
elements can be rearranged so that the overall appearance of the
product is different.
If the courts are truly allowing comparison of functional ele-
ments, they are engaging in the same error made in copyright cases
when ideas are not dissected prior to the substantial similarity deter-
mination. However, it may be that the courts simply are not explic-
itly analyzing functionality with the appropriate detail. It is possible,
for instance, that courts employing the "aggregate approach" to
functionality have implicitly judged that certain features are func-
tional, but that their locations are not functional. Thus, they may be
operating on abstraction level E. This may be appropriate, as long as
competitive realities with regard to potential alternate positions of
the features are correctly considered. However, the decisionmaker
must consider substantial similarity with a full understanding of the
limits of functionality for each feature. For instance, in LeSportsac,
Inc. v. K Mart Corp.,"' the judge should have clearly provided that
his determination of substantial similarity was in no way supported
by the existence of hollow rectangular zippers in each bag. Likewise,
juries must be instructed regarding how functional features and rela-
tionships should be incorporated in their evaluation of similarity.
The result will not only be better decisions, but also more consis-
tency in the courts' approach to customer confusion.
With regard to substantial similarity, one last interesting paral-
lel with copyright has arisen. Courts in trademark cases now are
asking whether the defendant's product design has the same "look"
as that of the plaintiff.1" This obviously mirrors the look and feel
language of copyright. The danger here is that the substantial simi-
117. '1647 F. Supp. at 1539.
118. Id. See also Stormy Clime, Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 977 (2d Cir.
1987) ("In conducting its inquiry, the District Court should assess ... the feasibility of alter-
native arrangements of functional features that would not impair the utility of the product.");
LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 76 (2d Cir. 1985) ("But by breaking LeSport-
sac's trade dress into its individual elements and then attacking certain of those elements as
functional, K Mart misconceives the scope of the appropriate inquiry."); American Greetings
Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1204, 1220 (D.N.J. 1985) ("[D]efendants'
products could and should have been designed to minimize confusion with plaintiff's products
by . . . combining functional elements in a different manner.").
119. 754 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1985).
120. See, e.g., Hdrtford House, 647 F. Supp. at 1540; Harlequin Enterprises, Ltd. v.
Gulf & Western Corp., 503 F. Supp. 647, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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larity test serves different purposes in its respective contexts. In
copyright, substantial similarity is a proxy for potential interference
with investment returns; in trademark, it is a factor in deciding the
likelihood of confusion. The apparent blurring of the separate doc-
trines is another indication that the trademark system may be over-
stepping its proper boundaries and moving into the realm rightfully
controlled by copyright.
V. CONCLUSION
Copyright and trademark each have their respective roles in the
federal intellectual property system. Neither is designed to interfere
with patent system policies, and each has mechanisms to ensure this
result. Although these approaches have evolved into somewhat
equivalent investigations regarding functionality, important distinc-
tions must remain. Most critically, a feature is functional within the
trademark system if exclusive rights to it would yield any supra-
normal profit potential, whereas in copyright, functionality occurs
when monopoly profits may be realized. The trend advocating that
creative incentives should be provided by the trademark system un-
dermines this distinction and jeopardizes the integrity of the copy-
right system. Therefore, the time has come to fully recognize the
growing parallels between the two systems so that appropriate limits
can be concretely established.
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